INTRODUCTION
Economic sanctions have gained more political legitimacy and are being more widely used as a tool to improve the willingness of unemployed clients to participate in activities within the framework of active labour market policy (ALMP) in Denmark 32 Intersentia . Reforms in many countries have shift ed the way in which welfare states treat citizens who are unable to participate in the labour market (Soldatic and Pini 2012) . In Denmark the reforms have gradually widened the target group for the active programmes, increased the requirements placed on the unemployed, introduced harsher penalties for their failure to meet these requirements, and placed greater emphasis on compliance (Bigby and Files 2003) . Th e use of economic sanctions on cash benefi t recipients is central to this development. Quantitative analyses show a substantial increase in the use of economic sanctions in Denmark, including sanctions on those who are categorised as having problems in addition to unemployment . In 2006, 6.8 per cent of clients categorised as not ready for the labour market were sanctioned. In 2013, 13.5 per cent of clients in this category received a sanction (jobindsats.dk). Th e focus of this article is on the use of economic sanctions on cash benefi t recipients with multiple barriers to work. Th ese clients are sometimes referred to in the literature as the 'hard-to-serve' or the 'hardto-employ' (Butler et al. 2012; Soss et al. 2011a) .
Sanctions are administered by street-level bureaucrats working in welfare organisations; a group of employees who are considered to have a major impact on policy, since they are delivering the services to the citizens (Lipsky 1980 ). Th e streetlevel bureaucrats' room for manoeuvre is, however, like the hole in the doughnut, surrounded by a belt of restrictions (Dworkin 1978: 31) . Th e restrictions are imposed from national, local and operational levels, giving rise to the organisational perspective on street-level bureaucracy (Brodkin 2008) . In Denmark there are substantial diff erences in the use of sanctions from one municipality to another, a diff erence which is not immediately explicable by diff erences in the characteristics of the unemployed . Th us, the municipal organisations seem to have an impact on shaping street-level behaviour in imposing sanctions. Th is argument is in line with the fi ndings of Soss, Fording and Schram (2011a; 2011b) , who see sanctions as organised practice, which means that sanctions are refl ecting organisational characteristics and not merely client characteristics. Th e ambition of this article is to explore the point made by Soss et al. (2011b) that few studies have paid attention to the diff erent aspects of organisational structure, process and culture in relation to the use of sanctions. Th ey argue that: 'Th e omission is striking because it ignores the obvious fact that sanction decisions are made in the context of organizational routines, by actors who occupy specifi c organizational positions (…) scholars have failed to address one of the most distinctive and critical features of contemporary poverty governance: the interplay of systems for disciplining clients (e.g., sanctions) and systems for disciplining service providers (e.g., performance management)' (Soss et al. 2011b: 205) .
Th e performance measures in the Danish case are somewhat diff erent from and less harsh than in the North American case, and we therefore want to investigate how this works in a diff erent setting, namely the Danish setting. A substantial part of literature on the use of economic sanctions has focused on welfare recipients and the eff ects of 33 these sanctions in terms of welfare exit (Rosholm and Svarer 2008; Svarer 2011; Van der Klaauw and Van Ours 2013) . In this article we contribute to the research on economic sanctions in three diff erent ways. First, we contribute to the limited literature on the interplay between sanctioning systems aimed at clients and systems for disciplining service providers (in Jobcentres and Cash Benefi t Offi ces) as pointed out above by Soss et al. Secondly, we explore economic sanctions in a rather diff erent setting, that is, in a universalistic welfare state, where benefi ts are considered generous and in a country with a long tradition of ALMP. Th irdly, but related to the fi rst two ways, we explore economic sanctions in a diff erent governance setting. Whereas the employment service in the US is primarily run by private providers who are at risk of going out of business if they lose customers, the employment services in Denmark are run by municipalities as essential organisational units within the Danish welfare state. However, municipalities are potentially at risk of losing the task of managing the employment services if they are perceived, at a national level, to be performing poorly (Th uesen et al. 2009) .
Previous research has shown that the implementation of ALMP policies in the Danish municipalities has tended to be more in line with a human capital and social integration approach than with a disciplining and harsher work-fi rst approach (Larsen 2001; Larsen and Bredgaard 2009) . In a recent Danish study only 13 per cent of the caseworkers across the Danish municipalities gave highest priority to 'using economic sanctions when clients fail to appear at meetings in the jobcentre' (Jørgensen et al. 2014) . Our expectations would be that, given the long tradition of ALMP in Denmark (Larsen 2013) , the implementation of sanctions will co-exist with a focus on social integration and human capital, making the sanction practices less paternalistic in Denmark than elsewhere, especially for the hard-to-employ.
Our two research questions are, fi rst, how does the implementation of a sanctioning regime reshape the conditions of work in the municipal employment services? And, second, how do workers and managers respond to these conditions in practice?
THE ORGANISATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACIES
In this section we outline the literature on street-level bureaucrats -and the organisations they inhibit -in order to develop a theoretical framework for the analysis. A central point in the literature on street-level bureaucracy is that policy is not created by politicians but rather translated and realised at the very frontline of the welfare state (Lipsky 1980) . If the actions of street-level bureaucrats diverge from national policies, it is arguable that this poses a problem for democracy. Numerous studies have followed this line of thought and have attempted to explain why and how this seems to be the case (Hupe and Hill 2007; Sandfort 2000 and many others). Street-level bureaucrats, by defi nition, have room for discretion. Th eir discretionary role is central to the study of street-level bureaucracies. However, previous research
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Intersentia shows diff ering approaches as to how to view the application of discretion in a welfare benefi t context. While initially the literature focused on the shared dilemmas of streetlevel bureaucrats across several areas of welfare provision (Lipsky 1980) , later works have focused on other ways of understanding or explaining the divergence between national policy and welfare provision at the frontline. Some studies have focused on individual diff erences between street-level bureaucrats in relation to political preferences or disagreement with national policy (May and Winter 2007; Winter 2002) . A more recent stream of research on street-level bureaucracy focuses on the role of organisations in analysing street-level behaviour (Brodkin 2011; Soss et al. 2011b) . Th e organisational approach 'begins, not at the policy level, but at the organizationallevel, examining what they do in street-level practice, why, and what these practices produce' (Brodkin 2008: 322) . A central argument in this line of research is that new public management strategies, such as performance measures and other forms of accountability, shape the coping strategies of the street-level bureaucrats in diverse and complex ways. Studying welfare sanctions in the US, Soss et al. (2011a; 2011b) point out that a traditional street-level perspective on the use of sanctions may lead to misinterpretation. Perceiving the street-level bureaucrat as a policy-maker may lead to criticism from several sides. At one end of the spectrum, the critics may say that frontline workers play a crucial role when they fail to implement the economic sanctions properly. Critics from a diff erent part of the spectrum may argue that tough punitive tools in the hands of frontline workers may lead these workers to use them in unjust and arbitrary ways. Soss et al. argue that when it comes to analysing sanctions, it is problematic to omit the organisational level in relation to street-level behaviour. Th ey claim that '…organisational forces can shape worker autonomy and channel behaviour at the frontline' and further, that '…organisational routines, tools, norms, incentives, information systems and categories of understanding function as mechanisms of social control that shape the use of discretion in predictable ways' (Soss et al. 2011b: 225) . In other words, the frontline worker inevitably has room for discretion, but the organisations infl uence the use of discretion at the frontline. For instance, Soss et al. (2011a; 2011b) found that, in the case of TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families), the use of sanctions could be explained by diff erent mechanisms. One such mechanism was that due to the lack of other off ers social workers turned to the threat of sanctions in order to achieve compliance from the client. Rather than believing in the actual eff ect of the sanction, it was seen as a result of A leading to B; the threat of a sanction, in the hope of compliance, resulted in actual sanctions when compliance did not occur. Discretion plays an important part when economic sanctions are imposed on those who have substantial problems in addition to unemployment. Th us, discretion is not only defi ned by street-level bureaucrats, but also by street-level organisations. Soss et al. (2011b) argue that caseworkers are 'ambivalent actors caught in the cross-pressure of competing values, identities and organizational forces (…) most express a strong commitment to social service ideals and value their identities as providers who are responsive to clients' 35 needs' (Soss et al. 2011b: 291) . Th ey conclude: '…sanctioning is more than a response to client behaviours and characteristics and more than an individual action taken by a case manager. Sanctioning is an organized practice, and as a result, the frequency and incidence of sanctions depend on organizational forces' (Soss et al. 2011b: 227) . Taking a closer look at the organisational side of sanctioning, practice seems relevant. In a brilliant study of encounters in French welfare offi ces, Dubois (2010) presents a similar argument: 'Th rough the institutions, collective norms are reproduced; the individual's rights and duties towards society are distributed' (Dubois 2010: 183) . Th us, the argument here is that not only that norms and tools play a role at an institutional level, but they must also be analysed with an awareness of the role of organisations.
In this article, we direct our attention to responses from both the organisational and individual level regarding the implementation of sanctions. First, we focus our attention on how the use of sanctions is infl uenced by external pressures, such as performance measurement systems and bench-marking. Th e organisational infrastructure must fi rst be outlined. By organisational infrastructure, we mean the formalised division of work and the physical layout of offi ces and tasks. Secondly, the internal conditions for imposing sanctions and the ways in which front line workers and managers respond to this are analysed. We focus here on the way in which managers and caseworkers explain and justify the active use of economic sanctions.
SETTING: THE DANISH UNEMPLOYMENT SYSTEM
Denmark maintains a high level of social security in the form of generous and universal access to welfare benefi ts combined with a fl exible labour market. For this reason the country has received international attention and has been viewed as a positive example of active labour market policies (ALMP) (Kvist and Pedersen 2007; Svarer 2011) . In European countries welfare benefi ts are frequently used to support the long-term unemployed. Th is is also the case in Denmark. Th e most important welfare benefi t for marginalised people is a cash benefi t. Th is is a temporary, monthly benefi t, which is conditional on a set of eligibility criteria and is means-tested. In Denmark clients stay on this cash benefi t for a long time, sometimes for many years. According to a recent policy document published by the Ministry of Employment, 15 per cent of cash benefi t recipients have been receiving the benefi t for more than fi ve years, while 6 per cent have been cash benefi t recipients for ten years or more (Ministry of Employment 2013).
POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN REGARDS TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Th rough political reform, Denmark has seen a gradual but substantial widening of the target group for economic sanctions. Partly based on research (such as Rosholm and Svarer 2008; Svarer 2011) , the Danish authorities have widened the use of economic Intersentia sanctions with the assumption that these are an eff ective tool for motivating unemployed people to get back into employment. Th e use of sanctions has been promoted at a national policy level since the mid1990s through numerous reforms, legislation and political rhetoric. Th e beginning of 2013 saw yet another reform of the cash benefi t system (Ministry of Employment 2013) which refl ects political confi dence in the positive eff ects of economic sanctions. It introduces harsher economic sanctions and focuses on enhancing the clients' transition into work. Sanctions are identifi ed as the solution for a certain hypothetical group of clients, that is, those who 'systematically avoid the demands placed upon them' (Ministry of Employment 2013). Th e many ALMP reforms in Denmark have not only reformed the substance of policy, but equally importantly, the reforms have been technical and focused on the operational level of how policy is translated into practice in street level organisations (Larsen 2011) . Specifi c performance measures have been implemented alongside these reforms and are now important tools for politicians and managers (Hammerschmid et al. 2013) . For instance, the frequency of interaction between frontline workers in the Jobcentre and cash benefi t recipients has been prescribed in legislation and the categories used to defi ne the type of measures have been defi ned by the National Labour Market Authority (Caswell 2013) . Th ese categories are closely intertwined with the type and likelihood of economic sanctions aimed at the client.
According to a study from 2011 , 11 per cent of all cash benefi t recipients are sanctioned (around 15,000 individuals) and around 40 per cent of them are subject to two or more separate sanctions. Th e study also showed that, compared to cash benefi t recipients as a whole, those who receive an economic sanction are more likely to be younger and male, with little or no education. According to the website jobindsats.dk, which contains information from the National Labour Market Authority, 21 per cent of all cash benefi t recipients were subject to one or more sanctions in 2013 (jobindsats.dk). Th e vast majority of these sanctions are 'periodical sanctions' (Caswell et al. 2011 and jobindsats.dk) . Th is means that the cash benefi t is stopped from the moment a client refuses an off er, fails to attend a meeting or in other ways fails to live up to demands placed on them by the welfare system. Th us, in eff ect, the social security safety net is removed from the client until they change their behaviour to meet the requirements imposed by the Jobcentre. In next section we illustrate how diff erent sanctions are related to diff erent types of non-compliance with the requirements of the Jobcentre.
THE MUNICIPALITIES ROLE IN IMPLEMENTING SANCTIONS
Danish municipalities play a very important part in delivering welfare services as they are in charge of implementing national legislation. Danish municipalities have wide spread autonomy and can collect taxes. Local diff erences are thus to be expected. Th e employment services, however, are one of the most heavily regulated 37 areas. National legislation contains rules guiding the application of discretion as well as the organisation of the municipal employment services. We return to this later in the article. Th e use of economic sanctions cannot be separated from discretionary practices at the municipal level. Th e legislation states that, when it comes to clients with problems in addition to unemployment, the municipality has to make an individual assessment as to whether sanctions should be used. In the legislative documents the 'municipality' is always named as the implementing actor, and not, for instance, the caseworker. Th e 98 Danish municipalities show signifi cant diff erences in their use of economic sanctions, even when background factors such as the unemployment rate, the population's age profi le and educational level are taken into account, indicating that discretion either at organisational or individual level, is being applied diff erently across municipalities. If the frontline workers at the municipal Jobcentre fi nd a client to be ready to participate in a specifi c activation project, then the client is required to participate. Consequently, active labour market measures and the target group for them must be defi ned and developed at the municipal level. Sanctions are directed at non-compliance. For clients categorised as ready for the labour market, compliance entails accepting job off ers and job seeking activities. Compliance is, however, also required of clients who have problems in addition to unemployment. In these cases the focus is not on the client applying for jobs, but rather on the client's willingness to participate in meetings with frontline workers at the Jobcentre or in activation projects aimed at dealing with any problems that might prevent them from being available for work. Aft er January 2014, cash benefi t recipients are, by defi nition, either ready for the labour market, ready for education or ready for active measures to overcome barriers for labour market participation. Th is means that it is now impossible for the Jobcentre to defi ne clients as 'temporarily passive', which previously existed as a category for those unemployed clients whom any kind of activation was believed counterproductive. Th e implication of this is that all clients, including those with substantial problems other than unemployment can be sanctioned, if they have been given an active off er deemed to be appropriate for them.
METHODOLOGY
Th is paper is based on interviews with managers and caseworkers working with cash benefi t recipients in municipal Jobcentres. Th e data stems from a qualitative study of two municipalities which both have a high level of sanctions compared to other Danish municipalities. Th e qualitative study included 18 interviews: fi ve interviews with management and staff in both municipalities and eight interviews with cash benefi t recipients who had repeatedly experienced economic sanctions. We approached management in the selected Jobcentres to ask for their participation. Th e municipalities were Intersentia informed that we had chosen them because of their high level of sanctions. Both of the selected municipalities agreed to participate. 1 In both municipalities all relevant managers were interviewed. A number of caseworkers were also selected for interview. Th is selection was done in cooperation with the management at the municipality. Th e caseworkers selected were selected on the basis of their work experience in dealing with the particular group of cash benefi t recipients we were interested in (cash benefi t recipients with problems beside unemployment). Th e interviews were conducted in the offi ces of the interviewee. Th ey were semistructured and focused on factors in the municipal landscape that we expected would play a role regarding the use of economic sanctions. Th ese factors were local political priorities, municipal organisation, the logic of practice in the municipalities including attitudes of the street-level bureaucrats towards clients, ALMP and economic sanctions. In the diff erent interviews we focused, in particular, on how economic sanctions were perceived and used in everyday practice by both managers and caseworkers in the two municipalities. Th e data also included observation at an activation project aimed at this particular group of benefi t recipients. During the observation (one day in each project) informal conversations were conducted with the professionals at the activation projects regarding attitudes towards and the use of economic sanctions in the municipality. Th e interviews conducted in Municipalities A and B were systematically coded for phrases where the use of economic sanctions was described, and in particular for how the diff erent actors explained what organisational trademarks made the use of economic sanctions possible. All accounts of how economic sanctions were used, including justifi cations and explanations, have been included. By analysing the interviews we identifi ed the organisational infrastructure and the procedures used when using sanctions. In the fi ndings section below, we present this data using quotes that represent patterns found across the interviews.
THE TWO MUNICIPALITIES
Th e two chosen municipalities (A and B) are not signifi cantly diff erent from other municipalities on any observable variables other than their high level of sanctions. Th ey are located in two opposite corners of Denmark. In terms of population both are slightly smaller than the average Danish municipality. One is located in a more rural part of Denmark, while the other is closer to the capital and thus defi ned as a nonrural municipality. Both municipalities have a lower number of cash benefi t recipients per 100 citizens than the national average. In addition, they both have a substantially higher than average level of sanctions.
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One manager even said in the initial contact that 'obviously you want to see how we do, as we are doing so well when it comes to sanctions.' 39 It is not possible to generalise from this analysis to the use of economic sanctions in Denmark as a whole. However, it does enable us to identify some of the internal organisational structures and responses from managers and workers regarding the frequent use of economic sanctions. Due to the qualitative nature of the study as well as the chosen perspective on the use of sanctions, this analysis is mainly explorative. Th e two municipal organisations that were selected are not representative of the entirety of Danish municipalities, but rather represent types of organisations in which the use of economic sanctions is relatively high. Looking at comparative cases of municipalities with low rates of sanctions would undoubtedly have strengthened our empirical design. However, this was unfortunately not possible in the study and it limits the extent to which we can make general conclusions.
FINDINGS
Th e structure of the fi ndings section of the article is as follows. First, we analyse how the use of sanctions is infl uenced by external pressures by looking at information systems and performance measures that support the use of economic sanctions towards cash benefi t recipients in the municipalities. Secondly, we analyse the internal conditions for imposing sanctions and the ways in which front line workers and managers respond in the two municipalities.
EXTERNAL PRESSURE: INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES
Th ere is external pressure from the regional and the national level on municipalities when it comes to the use of sanctions. In this part of the analysis we take a closer look at the information systems and performance measures that support the use of economic sanctions on the cash benefi t recipients in the municipalities. Th is external
Intersentia pressure is applied on all municipalities, but it is outside the bounds of this analysis to go beyond the two selected municipalities. Th e regional authorities in Denmark monitor the municipalities and publish the ranking of municipalities in terms of number of sanctions. Th e interviewees refer to these rankings. One caseworker said: 'Th e attendance register goes directly to the administrative group who sanction. I don't even get told. It is incredibly effi cient and clever (…) it is way more systematised here, so that is why we are placed so well in the statistics [that is, we have a high sanction rate]' (Caseworker, Jobcentre B). To be 'placed well' in the statistics means that they are 'at the top of the list' (see Table 1 ) when comparing how many sanctions the municipalities impose on their cash benefi t recipients. Both municipalities (A and B) are at the top of the list in their respective regions because they sanction more frequently than other municipalities in the region. Th is is considered good and desirable in municipalities A and B.
According to regulations, an assessment must be made by the municipality prior to any sanctions, assessing whether the sanctions are likely to promote the client's availability for work or attendance. Th e legislation does not specifi cally state that sanctions should be imposed whenever a cash benefi t recipient fails to attend an activation project, an interview at the Jobcentre or even if the cash benefi t recipient rejects a job off er. Discretion is inherent in these decisions. Th is is, however, not how the Head of Department in Municipality A sees it: '…all of them [the diff erent types of sanctions] (…) those sanctions are not discretionary. It says "HAVE TO" in the legislation (…) we do not use discretion in that way, unless of course there is a legitimate reason for the client not turning up. ' Th e interpretation of the legislation applied in this municipality only allows for the caseworkers' right to exercise discretion in the assessment of legitimate reasons for not doing something. It excludes the element of discretion from the assessment of whether sanctioning promotes availability for work or active measures. Th e municipal interpretation of the legislation thus becomes decisive for the cash benefi t recipient's risk of sanctioning.
Th e legislation states the obligation to use discretion in each case where sanctioning is considered, while at the regional level eff orts are made to promote the municipal use of economic sanctions. Th e records from the municipalities are transferred to a national database and used for analyses. Th is data is published on the website jobindsats.dk. Th e website enables the comparison of individual municipalities with a few mouse clicks. As an example, one of the municipalities in this study has been compared to the neighbouring municipality (see Table 2 , below). Th e comparison clearly shows a substantial diff erence between the levels of sanctions in the two municipalities. In our case, Municipality A, almost 40 per cent of the unemployed clients (Match 1) who were considered to be ready for the labour market were subject to a sanction in 2011, compared to 13 per cent of a similar group of unemployed clients in the municipality right next to them. Th e regional authority uses this data when they communicate with the municipalities about their implementation of ALMP, including the use of economic sanctions. Th e data enables the municipal level of sanctioning to be used as a performance measure, although without set targets to be met. Th e regional authority monitors and advises the municipalities within the region on their implementation of ALMP. Th e strong signals from both the regional and national levels on sanctioning as a desired practice may cause some municipalities to play it safe. In cases where the municipality is uncertain about the rules, they might choose to use a sanction whenever a client is absent. Th e database can be seen as a form of 'naming and shaming' (Hammerschmid et al. 2013) to make public the number of sanctions used by the municipal organisations. Th e use of economic sanctions can be seen to have a double eff ect: not only is the client sanctioned fi nancially for non-compliance, but the street-level organisation is also sanctioned through a public ranking system and varying degrees of pressure from regional and national authorities. Th e two municipalities in this study did, however, comply with the intentions from central government. A caseworker from Municipality A said: 'It [state regulation and reimbursement] aff ects the management extremely. Th at is the only thing on their mind and obviously it infl uences the caseworkers. Th ere are many things you wouldn't do if you didn't have to. Th e system has become so much more dynamic. Th e money comes from "above" and the attitudes are transferred downwards. It is tremendously important' (Caseworker, Municipality A).
Diff erent kinds of performance measures are used to promote the implementation of ALMP. One of these is the use of fi nancial reimbursement linked to specifi c activities in the organisation. Th e legislative demand to have meetings with clients every three months (timeliness) is one, and the degree to which clients are given activation off ers (degree of activation), is another. Th e level of compliance with this also diff ers across municipalities. In these highly sanctioning municipalities their approach seems to Intersentia mirror the intentions from central government. A caseworker says: 'Our municipality has benefi ted fi nancially on reimbursement from the state because the demands for activity has matched our municipal vision that you must "give to get something"' (Caseworker, Municipality A). Another caseworker refers to the performance measure of timeliness as a reason for the increase in the use of sanctions: 'Timeliness. Th ere has to be an explanation as to why we have not had that meeting with the client or given an activation off er to him or her. Th ere are more demands and thus more ways of not complying. Th at is why there are more situations in which you can sanction' (Caseworker, Municipality B).
INTERNAL CONDITIONS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSE
In this second part of the analysis we focus on the internal conditions for imposing sanctions and ways in which front line workers and managers respond to this in the two municipalities. Again, we initially take a look at the overall structure in all Danish municipalities before taking a closer look at the two highly sanctioning municipalities in this study.
Th ree organisational units are important: the Jobcentres, the Cash Benefi t Offi ces and the diff erent activation projects. It was decided by law in 2007 that the Jobcentres and the Cash Benefi t Offi ces should be physically separated. As a consequence, the Jobcentres carry out the assessment of the client and the Cash Benefi t Offi ces handle benefi t payments and impose the economic sanctions (withholding benefi t payments). However, there is room for discretion at municipal level as to how the competences and tasks are divided between the Jobcentres and the Cash Benefi t Offi ces. Th e typical organisation of the work in the 98 Danish Jobcentres means that caseworkers in the Jobcentres make the initial assessment of the client's potential in the employment market. Th e assessment ranks from Match Category 1 (ready to work), Match Category 2 (ready for active measures), and Match Category 3 (temporarily passive). 2 Th e caseworkers at the Jobcentre are also in charge of follow-up interviews and transferring clients to diff erent types of activation. Figure 1 illustrates the typical organisation of work when a sanction is imposed. Once a client is appointed to an activation project, the professionals responsible will monitor the client's attendance and report any absence to the Jobcentre or the Cash Benefi t Offi ce.
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With the implementation of the recent cash benefi t reform in 2014, the match categorisation tool has been discontinued. Th ere is now a diff erent way of categorising the cash benefi t recipient as either ready for work, ready for education, or ready for active measures. Th is may enhance the opportunities for sanctions, as no cash benefi t recipient can avoid activity of some kind (even if it is just a weekly 30-minute phone call with a mentor). At least in theory, refusing this will provide an opportunity to sanction. Th e two municipalities (A and B) are both organised along the lines described above. However, they have made local adjustments, which we consider to be likely contributors to their high level of economic sanctions. In both municipalities there is a high degree of specialisation and separation of competences between the Jobcentres, Cash Benefi t Offi ces and activation projects. Th e separation divides the responsibility for imposing sanctions between the individual units. First, the Jobcentre caseworker carries out an assessment of whether or not the client can participate in an activation project. Second, the professional at the particular activation project reports the client's absence, and, fi nally, the Cash Benefi t Offi ce withholds the benefi t payment, but has no direct contact with the client. Th is separation between an assessment of the client and the withholding of benefi t constitutes an example of how the responsibility for economic sanctions is distributed between units. In Municipality B, the Head of Department describes the organisational structure as follows: 'Offi cially we cannot make rules for how to apply the discretion, so obviously we are not doing that. On the other hand, we do have some rules about who can do what. What we have done in relation to the economic sanctions is not to involve the caseworker in the issue of non-attendance and absence from an activity. Th is means that once a caseworker has assigned somebody to an activity, the actual monitoring and report on absence is between the activity and the Cash Benefi t Offi ce' (Head of Department, Municipality B).
So the administration of economic sanctions in Municipality B relies on the distance between the authority imposing the sanctions (the Cash Benefi t Offi ce) and the client and, at the same time, on automatic procedures. Each time a municipality intends to impose an economic sanction the client will be sent a letter so that he or she has a chance to respond. If the client does not respond to the letter, the authority imposes the sanction. When the client does respond and provides an explanation for the absence, the municipality has to assess whether the explanation is satisfactory.
Intersentia Th e separation of tasks in relation to the economic sanctions is considered pivotal in the municipalities. A supervising caseworker from Municipality B explains: 'We have a sharp division of labour. Of course we do the casework, but it is in the Cash Benefi t Offi ce that the fi nal decision about sanctioning is made. We believe that by separating the two it becomes more straightforward. Th e citizen cannot just call and say: "Well, I just couldn't make it". No, if you are not ill, you are not on leave, or your child is not ill, then there is no [valid] explanation as to why you are not attending your activity. Th ey have fi rmer boundaries on this in the Cash Benefi t Offi ce, where they do not know the citizen. Th e citizen that we assign to activities needs to live up to the demands and call in sick and things like that. So we believe there is a benefi t in separating the two things, to stand fi rm on the sanctioning. We want to use the sanctions, because we believe it creates trustworthiness. Once you have agreed to attend an activity, well, then one of the demands is to become responsible, to attend or at least to call in sick.' (Supervising caseworker, Municipality B).
Th e quotation above illustrates how the caseworker plays no direct part in the sanctioning process. Once the client is attending an activity programme, any absence is reported directly to the Cash Benefi t Offi ce. Th e Cash Benefi t Offi ce then proceeds to withhold the benefi t payment. One of the caseworkers interviewed suggests that the caseworkers' separation from the sanctioning process can lead to a higher number of sanctions: 'Th e employees in the Cash Benefi t Offi ce are clerical staff , and they just think: "Well, if someone has been absent then I shall withhold the money". Where I believe that when a citizen calls his caseworker, who knows the life story of the citizen, the caseworker might be more likely to just say: "Well alright, never mind this time". I believe the Cash Benefi t Offi ce is applying more consequences because they don't know the citizen -what their problems are -they have just received a note which says "absence" and then they withhold the money." (Caseworker, Municipality B).
Th is caseworker's perception is mirrored in the following statement by an employee at the Cash Benefi t Offi ce in Municipality A: 'I don't really go into whether it is good or bad or whether it [sanctioning] has an eff ect. If it's been decided that it's something we should do, then we do it. We are not supposed to feel or think -that's the way it is in the cash benefi t area -it's a bit stricter and we apply the legislation without compromising.' (Employee at Cash Benefi t offi ce, Municipality A). According to our mapping of the infrastructure and the informants' perception the organisational division of labour facilitates the high use of sanctions. Th is is shown in Figure 2 , below. Note that the diff erence with Figure 1 is the lack of connection/communication between the Jobcentre and the activation project. Th e managers and Caseworkers in the two municipalities explained and justifi ed the active use of economic sanctions in the municipalities in a number of diff erent ways. One explanation was contradictory with reference to diff erent bureaucratic and professional norms. At the local level the management praised the caseworkers' professional values and highlighted them as a safeguard against unjustifi ed decisions.
Other responses either justifi ed sanctions, displayed pride with sanctions or excused sanctions. Below we illustrate these patterns in the data using quotes from interviewees.
CONTRADICTORY JUSTIFICATIONS
One manager stated: 'I have never experienced a situation where we have been too strict [made a citizen attend an activity he was not fi t for]. Th e social workers make the assessments, and they are really good at making a correct professional welfare assessment. We have high ethical standards in our work and high professional standards.' (Team Leader, Municipality A). Th is manager used the social workers' professional values (as opposed to the professional values of clerical staff ) to substantiate her argument about how they were never too strict with clients and did not impose unjust sanctions. However, the same manager repeatedly stressed how the employees should not be allowed to exercise discretion when deciding whether or not to apply economic sanctions. She argued that, in their organisation, it is considered an off ence if they did not use the economic sanctions available. She said: 'As a general rule I don't think you should be allowed to use discretion because it simply makes it too hard for the caseworkers. I mean, illegal absence is illegal absence [if the client is not attending their activities and does not have a medical certifi cate it is illegal absence and they can be subjected to economic sanctions]. Based on their match category, we have assigned activities to them Intersentia that they are able to attend, even though they might have very few resources' (Team Leader, Municipality A). Th is manager regarded compliance with organisational rules as the main priority for her staff . Such a view runs counter to what would normally be considered professionalism, which can be defi ned by the professional's right to exercise discretion in a particular area (Molander and Terum 2010) . Bearing in mind our preceding analysis, it also appears that the organisational infrastructure facilitates a bureaucratic approach to the client, that is, an approach primarily concerned with procedures and regulations. One could argue that the manager expressed contradictory justifi cations: on the one hand, the caseworker's correct and professional assessment served as a legitimate basis for the use of sanctions, which implies the positive recognition of the caseworker's professionalism. However, in the case of sanctions she made assumptions about the very same professional's ability to exercise discretion ('It is too hard on the caseworkers'), thus promoting their predominantly bureaucratic approach. Th e responses of the caseworkers illustrate similar contradictions, this time between the overall aim of sanctions (to promote clients' exit from welfare benefi ts, preferably to work) and a professional social work norm of helping people cope with undesirable life situations. A caseworker says: 'No, they [the sanctioned cash benefi t recipients] do not necessarily become more self-supporting. It may make them more responsible. Th ey have to understand that cash benefi t is a temporary benefi t. If a person feels responsible for the duties they have, it can help them to move on' (Caseworker, Municipality B).
JUSTIFYING SANCTIONS WITH SOCIAL WORK NORMS
When a caseworker was asked what an economic sanction was, she explained it as a means to establish contact with the clients. A caseworker in municipality A said: 'It's not like they will sober up from one day to the next just because we cut their benefi ts, but it might make them pop in so we can get them to start alcohol treatment, activation or something else'. In addition, she used consideration for the client as the justifi cation for sanctions. In Municipality B the picture appears to be very similar. Caseworkers saw the use of sanctions as a way to get in contact with the client if all else failed: 'an economic sanction is our tool to get in contact with the citizen, if we can't otherwise get in contact with them' (Caseworker, Municipality B). Th e caseworker in this example argued that sanctions provide a tool for helping clients, since clients cannot receive the help they need if they choose not to communicate with the caseworkers. Th e sanction, or perhaps rather the threat of a sanction, appears to be seen by some of the caseworkers as a possible wake-up call for clients. Th e use of sanctions is also justifi ed by the caseworkers by referring to respect for the client. 'I have this one addict (…) I believe he is able to come to meetings and he does show up. Th ey just need to have the respect. Th ey have to know that this is a job that I do -otherwise I might as well be a robot -it is because I mean well. I have to know if they need help, if they have an addiction, so yes, they do get deducted [i.e. their cash benefi t is removed]. Th e same rules apply to them.' (Caseworker, Municipality A). Th e use of sanctions is justifi ed 47 by caseworkers with reference to getting into contact with clients, helping them, as a wake-up call or as showing them respect. All of these justifi cations are based on the assumption that the sanction makes the client interact with the caseworker, but do not address the cases in which a sanction makes the client leave welfare altogether or may lead to unintentional consequences (such as crime, borrowing money, building debt, etc.). One caseworker implicitly addresses this by saying: 'I really wonder how people can live without benefi ts for months. Th ey must be doing something else. People with drug problems -I really wonder how they get by' (Caseworker, Municipality A).
PROUD OF SANCTIONS
Another caseworker described why he believes this particular Jobcentre has one of the highest levels of economic sanctions: 'It is better organised. It runs administratively. It is not random whether the caseworkers use the sanctions or not' (Caseworker, Municipality A). Th e same caseworker explained how the management aff ected his attitude to using the sanctions: 'Clients have to be sanctioned. It is communicated at the meetings. Obviously, it has an impact on my work. I have to understand what the norm is here. For instance, I wouldn't sanction everybody, if the general attitude was against sanctions.' However, later in the interview when asked about his scope for discretion in regards to whether a client should be sanctioned or not, he stated that: 'I feel I have a lot of possibilities. I can write my way through it. Normally I can decide if they shouldn't be sanctioned. It's not like you have to use the sanctions' (Caseworker, Municipality A). Th e quote illustrates that, even though the caseworker perceived his room for discretion as large, the management aff ected the way he used it ('I have to understand what the norm is here'). According to the caseworker, the organisational infrastructure supported a bureaucratic approach. Th is allowed them to be at 'the top' of the ranking in the Jobcentre. At the same time he stated that there was considerable scope for the exercise of discretion.
EXCUSING OR DISAGREEING WITH SANCTIONS
Th e development in ALMP reforms have moved towards a stronger element of governance and now focus on the operational aspects of policy implementation (Larsen 2013) . One of the arguments for this in Denmark has been the resistance of street level bureaucracies towards a work-fi rst oriented practice. Although this resistance is far from pervasive in the interview data, some signs of resistance towards the use of economic sanctions can be identifi ed data (from caseworkers in Municipalities A and B).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
When analysing the data from the two municipalities in which sanctions were used frequently, it appears that external pressure in the form of diff erent possibilities for Intersentia performance measurement and bench-marking has impacted on the municipalities' way of organising the work -the sanctioning regime is both visible in the rhetoric and on the practical level (the organisational infrastructure) in the two municipalities. Th e reshaping of the conditions of work resulted not only from the sanctions directed at the clients, but also from the sanctions directed at the municipal organisational level. Th ese sanctions were more subtle and included, for instance, the process of 'naming and shaming'. Both can be seen as aspects of accountability, and thus of holding both the citizens and the street-level caseworkers to account. Th is argument is similar to that of van Berkel (2013) , who argued that activation policies can be seen to work in three ways: they activate the client, they activate the organisation and they activate the frontline workers. Workers and managers responded to these conditions by giving diff erent forms of explanation and justifi cation. Th e organisational routines and infrastructure mainly served to justify sanctions from a bureaucratic perspective, one primarily concerned with procedures and regulations, while organisational practice was simultaneously justifi ed by references to professional norms and values. One contradictory explanation refers to both bureaucratic and professional norms. Th is can be seen in the way in which management praised the caseworkers as the safeguards of ethical considerations where no client with substantial social problems is unjustly sanctioned. At the same time, the organisation trumped the caseworker for more effi cient implementation of economic sanctions. Other responses either justifi ed sanctions, displayed pride with sanctions or excused sanctions. We argue in line with Soss et al. (2011b) that the caseworkers might have a hard time as they are seen as guarantors of high ethical standards, and, at the same time, their room for discretion is 'under attack' from their own management. Th eir professional norms might be contested by the organisational infrastructure, or possibly transformed by it. Th e dilemma present in these confl icting norms around the use of economic sanctions on cash benefi t recipients mirrors a dilemma found by Soss et al. in their study of case managers' use of discretion and sanctions: while identifying positively with the labour market orientation and performance measures inherent in the policy towards the unemployed, they resist the '…dehumanizing force that threatens their commitment to a more caring and responsive vision of social service' (Soss et al., 2011b: 222) . A similar point is made by Schram and Silverman (2012) that, within the political framework of welfare to work, human service providers are required to 'not only discipline their clients but also staff in ways that call into question their ability to act consistently with the most altruistic ideals of the helping professions' (Schram and Silverman 2012: 129) . We wish to nuance this point as we, in our material, see arguments from the helping professions that are used to justify and explain sanctions, so, at least on a symbolic level, the professionalism of social work still enjoys respect. Th is can, however, be an expression of hypocrisy, as pointed out by Nils Brunsson (1989) . Møller and Stone (2012) have analysed caseworkers' perspectives on the active labour policy paradigm in Denmark. Th ey argue that norms are changing and that sanctions have played a part in that change. Th ey claim that '…sanctions pressure 49 caseworkers to accept new norms of active labour policy' (Møller and Stone 2012: 16) . Th e legitimisation of the use of sanctions represents a new organisational norm which is refl ected in our study; one in which management applies a diff erent -and stricter -interpretation of the legislation. Th is supports Brodkin's point: '…what street-level organizations do in the name of policy is not limited to what formal policy would seem to require' (Brodkin 2011: 200) . Traditionally research on street-level bureaucracy has mainly focused on the ways in which street-level bureaucracies fall short in implementing policy. One might pose the question: to what extent do streetlevel organisations go beyond the legislation such as the case seems to be when it comes to the use of economic sanctions in Denmark?
